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1 Introduction
Games with strategic substitutes (GSS) and games with strategic complements (GSC) for-
malize two basic economic interactions and have widespread applications.1 In GSS, best-
response of each player is weakly decreasing in the action of each of the other players. For
example, consider a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs. In
GSC, best-response of each player is weakly increasing in actions of the other players. For
example, consider a game of network externalities, where a given player’s marginal benefit
from adopting a technology is increasing as more other players adopt the same technology.2
In this paper, we focus on stability (or robustness) properties of predicted outcomes in
GSS. In particular, we study stability of equilibrium, and stability of parameterized equilib-
rium selections.
With regard to stability of equilibrium, we first show that in GSS, convergence of the
best response dynamic starting from the inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to
convergence of every adaptive dynamic3 to the same (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. In
other words, in GSS, convergence of the best response dynamic from inf (or sup) of the
strategy space is equivalent to global stability, where global stability is defined as convergence
of every adaptive dynamic to the same (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
This result provides a new perspective on global stability. In GSS, knowledge of conver-
gence of a single best response dynamic yields convergence of all adaptive dynamics to the
same outcome. Consequently, whether players actually play best response dynamics or not,
convergence of a single best response dynamic is sufficient to conclude convergence under
all adaptive behavior. This provides an alternative to the traditional eigen-value approach
applied to each dynamic in a class of dynamics, as in, for example, Al-Nowaihi and Levine
1Such games are defined in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), and as they show, models of
strategic investment, entry deterrence, technological innovation, dumping in international trade, natural
resource extraction, business portfolio selection, and others can be viewed in a more unifying framework
according as the variables under consideration are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Earlier
developments are provided in Topkis (1978) and Topkis (1979).
Versions of such games arise in diverse economic environments, including competitive strategy, public
goods, industrial organization, natural resource utilization, manufacturing analysis, team management,
tournaments, resource allocation, business portfolio development, principal-agent modeling, multi-lateral
contracting, auctions, technological innovation, behavioral economics, and others.
2 There is a long literature developing the theory of GSC. Some of this work can be seen in Topkis (1978),
Topkis (1979), Lippman, Mamer, and McCardle (1987), Sobel (1988), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Vives
(1990), Zhou (1994), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Milgrom and Roberts (1994), Shannon (1995), Villas-
Boas (1997), Edlin and Shannon (1998), Echenique (2002), Echenique and Sabarwal (2003), Quah (2007),
and Quah and Strulovici (2009), among others. Extensive bibliographies are available in Topkis (1998), in
Vives (1999), and in Vives (2005).
For some recent research on GSS, confer Amir (1996), Villas-Boas (1997), Amir and Lambson (2000),
Schipper (2003), Zimper (2007), Roy and Sabarwal (2008), Acemoglu and Jensen (2009), Acemoglu and
Jensen (2010), Roy and Sabarwal (2010), and Jensen (2010), among others.
3Recall that adaptive dynamics allow for strategic behavior and learning processes with very few restric-
tions. Intuitively, the only requirement in an adaptive dynamic is that eventually, future play should be
an undominated response to the order interval determined by past play, (or at least in the order interval
determined by such undominated responses.)
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(1985) and Okuguchi and Yamazaki (2008).
Next, we provide a connection to existing results on dominance solvability in GSS. Zimper
(2007) shows that in GSS, there exist smallest and largest serially undominated strategies,
and a GSS is dominance solvable iff the second iterate of the (joint) best response function
has a unique fixed point. We use a more general model than Zimper (2007), and show
that his results go through for our generalizations. In particular, in GSS, convergence of
the best response dynamic from inf (or sup) of the strategy space is equivalent to dominance
solvability.
Connecting these two results, we conclude that in GSS, global stability is equivalent
to dominance solvability. This brings together two different foundations for robustness of
predicted outcomes in games. Dominance solvability (and rationalizability) assume fully
informed players, using infinite iterations of rationalizing about potential (future) responses
by competitors to predict a solution to a one-shot game. Global stability uses dynamic
learning and strategic processes in a series of game-play over time, using past play by typi-
cally myopic players to determine present moves, and relying on limits of such learning and
strategic behavior to predict an outcome robust to the dynamics. In GSS, both approaches
are equivalent, and moreover, both global stability and dominance solvability can be checked
using a single best response dynamic.4
Recall that Moulin (1984) has shown that in all strategic games, dominance solvabil-
ity implies Cournot stability (convergence of all best-response dynamics), and that Zimper
(2007)’s results imply that in GSS, Cournot stability is equivalent to dominance solvability.
Our results extend this to show that in GSS, global stability (convergence of every adaptive
dynamic, not just best response dynamics) is equivalent to dominance solvability.
In addition to showing the theoretical equivalence of these approaches, we show that
these results can be used profitably in a variety of applications in diverse areas. We present
applications to games with linear best responses (such as simple Cournot oligopoly, common-
pool resource games, differentiated goods Cournot oligopoly with finitely many firms, and
private provision of public goods with finitely many consumers), games with non-linear best
responses (such as general, symmetric, homogeneous goods Cournot oligopoly, tournaments,
general two-player GSS, and general two-player GSC), and discrete games (such as Dove-
Hawk-Chicken-type games). In each case, knowledge of a particular aspect of the game
allows for powerful cross-derivation of results.
With regard to stability of equilibrium selections, we show that in parameterized GSS,
monotone equilibrium selections are dynamically stable, in the following sense.
We show that in parameterized GSS, continuous and strictly increasing equilibrium selec-
tions select strongly stable equilibria, under natural conditions. (Intuitively, an equilibrium
is strongly stable if it has a neighborhood such that every adaptive dynamic starting in this
neighborhood converges to it.) In particular, small changes in the parameter are dynami-
cally stable, because at a new parameter value, every adaptive dynamic starting from the
4Using Milgrom and Roberts (1990), it is easy to deduce that global stability is equivalent to dominance
solvability in GSC as well. What is not true in GSC is the equivalence of convergence of the best response
dynamic from inf (or sup) of strategy space to global stability, or to dominance solvability.
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old equilibrium converges to the newly selected equilibrium.
Similarly, we show that continuous and nowhere weakly increasing equilibrium selections
select equilibria that are not even weakly stable, under similar conditions. (Intuitively, an
equilibrium is weakly stable if it has a neighborhood such that some adaptive dynamic
starting in this neighborhood converges to it.) In particular, changes in the parameter are
dynamically unstable, because at a new parameter value, no adaptive dynamic starting from
the old equilibrium converges to the newly selected equilibrium.
Thus, when considering dynamically stable equilibria (as proposed by Samuelson’s Cor-
respondence principle), we may expect monotone selections of equilibria to arise naturally
in GSS. Echenique (2002) provides a similar result for parameterized GSC.
In addition to these results, we clarify two aspects of the theory of GSS.
First, we show that a GSS may not necessarily have a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium.
We present a three-player, two-action, Dove-Hawk-Chicken-type game with no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium. This shows that a GSS cannot always be viewed as an aggregative game,
or as a GSC, because such games always have a PSNE. In particular, the standard technique
of reversing the order on the strategy space of one player in a GSS to yield a GSC does not
extend to more than two players.
Second, fixed points of the second iterate of the joint best-responses play a significant
role in the analysis of GSS. These may be motivated in terms of simply rationalizable strate-
gies. Intuitively, a simply rationalizable strategy profile is one that can be simultaneously
rationalized by no more than two iterations of behavioral conjectures. They may be viewed
as outcomes of low-level rationalization, exhibiting a type of bounded rationality.5 Sim-
ply rationalizable profiles provide a behavioral interpretation for such fixed points. In this
terminology, in GSS, simple rationalization always predicts an outcome, even if a GSS has
no PSNE. Moreover, if simple rationalization predicts a unique outcome, then higher-level
rationalization has no additional benefit.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the results on global stability, and
their connection to dominance solvability. Section 3 provides several applications. Section 4
presents the results on stability of monotone equilibrium selections.
2 Stability of Equilibrium
Let I be a non-empty set of players, and for each player i, a strategy space that is a partially
ordered set (X i,i), and a real-valued payoff function, denoted f i(xi, x−i). As usual, the
domain of each f i is the product of the strategy spaces, (X,) endowed with the product
order.6 The strategic game Γ = {I, (X i,i, f i)i∈I} is a game with strategic substitutes
5Nash equilibrium profiles are simply rationalizable, and simply rationalizable profiles are rationalizable;
both inclusions may be strict.
6The topology on X i is the standard order interval topology, and the topology on X is the product
topology. For notational convenience, we shall sometimes drop the index i from the notation for the partial
order.
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(GSS), if for every player i,
1. X i is a complete lattice,
2. For every x−i, f
i is order upper semi-continuous in xi, and for every xi, f
i is order
continuous in x−i,
3. For every fixed x−i, f
i is quasi-supermodular in xi,
7 and
4. f i satisfies the decreasing single-crossing property in (xi; x−i).
8
As compared to Milgrom and Roberts (1990), we have replaced supermodular with its
ordinal generalization, quasi-supermodular, and replaced increasing differences with the de-
creasing single-crossing property, an ordinal generalization of decreasing differences. The
decreasing single-crossing property captures the idea of strategic substitutes, just as the
single-crossing property formalizes the idea of strategic complements.
For each player i, the best response of player i is denoted gi(x−i). As is well-known
(see, for example, Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), for each player i, the best response of
player i, gi(x−i), is a non-empty, complete lattice. Let g
i(x−i) = sup g
i(x−i) and g
i(x−i) =
inf gi(x−i) be the extremal best responses. As is well-known (see, for example, Topkis (1998)),
for each player i, and for each profile of other player strategies x−i, g
i(x−i) is nonincreasing in
x−i,
9 and therefore, for each player i, both gi(x−i) and g
i(x−i) are nonincreasing functions.
10
Let g : X  X, g(x) = (gi(x−i))i∈I , denote the joint best-response correspondence.
Then the correspondence g is nonincreasing,11 and the functions g(x) = inf g(x) and g(x) =
sup g(x) are nonincreasing.
As usual, a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of the game is a profile of player actions
x such that x ∈ g(x). The equilibrium set of the game is given by E = {x ∈ X|x ∈ g(x)}.
It is possible that a GSS has no (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium. Consider the following
example.
Example 1 (Dove-Hawk-Chicken). Consider a three-player version of a Dove-Hawk-
Chicken-type game, as follows. Suppose there are three players, and each player has a choice
between two actions: D (Dove) is the “lower” action (more dovish, more accommodating, less
aggressive action), and H (Hawk) is the “higher” action (more hawkish, less accommodating,
more aggressive action). Payoffs are given in figure 1.
7As in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), a function f : X → R (where X is a lattice) is quasi-supermodular
if (1) f(x) ≥ f(x ∧ y) =⇒ f(x ∨ y) ≥ f(y), and (2) f(x) > f(x ∧ y) =⇒ f(x ∨ y) > f(y).
8 A function f : X × T → R (where X is a lattice and T is a partially ordered set) satisfies decreasing
single-crossing property in (x; t) if for every x′  x′′ and t′  t′′, (1) f(x′, t′′) ≤ f(x′′, t′′) =⇒ f(x′, t′) ≤
f(x′′, t′), and (2) f(x′, t′′) < f(x′′, t′′) =⇒ f(x′, t′) < f(x′′, t′). This property is discussed in some detail in
Roy and Sabarwal (2010). Amir (1996) terms this property the dual single-crossing property.
9For every x−i and x
′
−i
, if x−i  x′−i then gi(x′−i) vi gi(x−i), where the order on nonempty subsets of
X i is the standard (induced) set order used in the literature. That is, for non-empty subsets A,B of X i,
A vi B if for every a ∈ A, and for every b ∈ B, a∧ b ∈ A, and a∨ b ∈ B, where the operations ∧,∨ are with
respect to i.
10For every x−i and x
′
−i
, if x−i  x′−i then gi(x′−i)  gi(x−i) and gi(x′−i)  gi(x−i).
11In the standard induced set order, as in Topkis (1998).
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Figure 1: A GSS with no (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium
Notice that each player wishes to be (weakly) less aggressive, the more aggressive are his
competitors. This game is an extension of a two-player, Dove-Hawk-Chicken game. Indeed,
if we fix the action of any one player, then the remaining two-player game is a version of a
standard Dove-Hawk-Chicken game that has a unique Nash equilibrium – one player plays
D and the other plays H. With three players, it is easy to check that this game has no (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium.
Example 1 clarifies another aspect of the theory of GSS. A GSS cannot always be viewed
as an aggregative game,12 or as a GSC, because both types of games always have a pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium. In particular, the standard technique of reversing the order on
the strategy space of one player in a GSS to yield a GSC does not extend to more than two
players.
Let’s now develop bounds on undominated strategies. As usual,13 a pure strategy xi ∈ X i
is strongly dominated, if there exists xˆi ∈ X i such that for every x−i, f i(xi, x−i) <
f i(xˆi, x−i). For a given set of strategy profiles Xˆ ⊂ X, player i’s undominated responses
to Xˆ is the set
Ui(Xˆ) =
{
xi ∈ X i|∀x′i ∈ X i, ∃xˆ ∈ Xˆ, f i(xi, xˆ−i) ≥ f i(x′i, xˆ−i)
}
.
Let U(Xˆ) = (Ui(Xˆ)i∈I) denote the collection of undominated responses to Xˆ, one for each
player, and let U(Xˆ) = [inf U(Xˆ), supU(Xˆ)] be the smallest order interval containing U(Xˆ).
Higher-order undominated strategies are defined iteratively, as follows: U0(Xˆ) = Xˆ, and for
k ≥ 1, Uk(Xˆ) = Uk−1(Xˆ). Building on techniques from Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the fol-
lowing lemma highlights the structure of the smallest order interval containing undominated
strategies.
Lemma 1. For every a  b in X, U [a, b] = [g(b), g(a)].
Proof. Let’s first see that U [a, b] ⊂ [g(b), g(a)]. Consider the contrapositive. Suppose
y 6∈ [g(b), g(a)]. Then either, y 6 g(a) or y 6 g(b). Suppose y 6 g(a). In particular, consider
player i such that yi 6 gi(a−i). Then yi ∧ gi(a−i) dominates yi, as follows. Indeed, for every
12Confer Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006), or Jensen (2010).
13Following Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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x ∈ [a, b],
f i(yi ∨ gi(a−i), a−i)− f i(gi(a−i), a−i) < 0
=⇒ f i(yi, a−i)− f i(yi ∧ gi(a−i), a−i) < 0
=⇒ f i(yi, x−i)− f i(yi ∧ gi(a−i), x−i) < 0,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of gi(a), the first implication follows from
quasi-supermodularity, and the second implication follows from decreasing single-crossing
property. The case y 6 g(b) follows similarly. Thus, y 6∈ U [a, b], whence U [a, b] ⊂ [g(b), g(a)].
Therefore, U [a, b] ⊂ [g(b), g(a)]. Moreover, as g is a best response, g(b) and g(a) are in U [a, b],
whence [g(b), g(a)] ⊂ U [a, b].
Lemma 1 shows that adjusting for strategic substitutes reverses the relationship that
holds for strategic complements.14 This provides an important insight into the appropriate
design of best-response dynamics that bound higher-order undominated strategies, as follows.
Suppose y0 = infX and z0 = supX. Then U0(X) ⊂ [y0, z0] = X. Lemma 1 shows that
U1(X) ⊂ [g(z0), g(y0)], and U 1(X) = [g(z0), g(y0)]. Thus, at the first iteration, it is useful
to transform y0 = infX to y1 = g(y0) and z0 = supX to z1 = g(z0). Similarly, another
iteration of the lemma yields
U2(X) = U(U(X)) ⊂ U([z1, y1]) ⊂ U([z1, y1]) = [g(y1), g(z1)] .
Thus, at the second iteration, it is useful to transform y1 to y2 = g(y1), and z1 to z2 = g(z1).
The process continues inductively. This is the construction followed here, and it turns out
be very useful to analyze GSS.15
The (simultaneous) best response dynamic starting at infX is the sequence (yk)∞k=0
given by y0 = infX, and for k ≥ 1, yk = g(yk−1) if k is even, and g(yk−1) if k is odd. Notice
that when g is a best-response function, (yk) is the standard simultaneous best-response
dynamic starting at infX. When g is a correspondence, lemma 1 shows that this is the
appropriate definition.
Similarly, the (simultaneous) best response dynamic starting at supX is the se-
quence (zk)∞k=0 given by z
0 = supX, and for k ≥ 1, zk = g(zk−1) if k is even, and g(zk−1)
if k is odd. Again, when g is a best-response function, (zk) is the standard simultaneous
best-response dynamic starting at supX.
Mixtures of the sequences (yk) and (zk) help to provide bounds on adaptive dynamics,
as follows. The lower mixture of ((yk); (zk)) is the sequence (xk)∞k=0 given by x
k = yk, if
14In a GSC, the corresponding result from Milgrom and Roberts (1990) is as follows: for every a, b ∈ X
such that a  b, U [a, b] = [g(a), g(b)].
15Compare this with the construction in Milgrom and Roberts (1990), where y0 = infX , and z0 = supX ,
and for k ≥ 1, yk = g(yk−1), and zk = g(zk−1). For GSC, this construction yields the following useful
facts: (yk) is monotone nondecreasing, (zk) is monotone nonincreasing, and these sequences are comparable
all along; that is, for every k, yk  zk. For GSS, this construction does not get us very far. In this case,
y0  z0, and then y0  y1, but then y2  y1, and then y2  y3, and y4  y3, and so on. Thus, a monotonic
relationship in the progression of elements in either sequence does not emerge. Moreover, if we consider the
second-iterate of this construction, then it is true that y0  y2, and inductively, for every k, y2k  y2k+2, and
therefore, the sequence (y2k) is nondecreasing, and similarly, (z2k) is nonincreasing. But with nonincreasing
g, it does not follow that in general, g ◦ g(y0)  g ◦ g(z0), and therefore, a clear comparison across the
sequences (yk) and (zk) does not emerge.
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k is even, and xk = zk, if k is odd, and the upper mixture of ((yk); (zk)) is the sequence
(xk)∞k=0 given by x
k = zk, if k is even, and xk = yk, if k is odd.16 These mixed sequences
have some useful properties, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (yk) and (zk) be the best response dynamics starting at infX and supX,
respectively, and (xk) and (xk) be their lower and upper mixtures, respectively.
1. The sequence (xk) is nondecreasing and there is x such that x = limk x
k.
2. The sequence (xk) is nonincreasing and there is x such that x = limk x
k.
3. For every k, xk  xk.
Proof. For statements (1) and (2), notice that if xk  xk+1, then xk+1 = g(xk)  g(xk+1) =
xk+2, and similarly, if xk  xk+1, then xk+1  xk+2. Thus, the sequence (xk) is nondecreasing,
and the sequence (xk) is nonincreasing, if x0  x1, and x0  x1. But this is true, because
x0 = infX, and x0 = supX. As X is complete, each of these sequences converges in X.
Statement (3) holds trivially for k = 0. Suppose xk  xk. Then xk+1 = g(xk)  g(xk) 
g(xk) = xk+1.
To define an adaptive dynamic, we follow Milgrom and Roberts (1990). A process
(x(k))k∈Kˆ in Γ is an adaptive dynamic in Γ if for every K, there is K
′ such that for
every k ≥ K ′, x(k) ∈ U [inf P (K, k), supP (K, k)]. Here, P (K, k) is the set of past play
from K up to (but not including) k; that is, P (K, k) = {x(ξ)|K ≤ ξ < k}.
Notice that the definition of an adaptive dynamic puts very few restrictions on strategic
or learning behavior. All it requires is that eventually, future play should be an undominated
response to the order interval determined by past play, or at least be in the order interval
determined by such undominated responses. In particular, adaptive dynamics include simul-
taneous Cournot dynamics, sequential Cournot dynamics, fictitious play, tatonnement-type
price adjustment dynamics, and they allow for various learning behavior, “mistakes,” and
other “out-of equilibrium” dynamics. The following result provides bounds on eventual
behavior of adaptive dynamics in GSS.
Lemma 3. Let (xk) and (xk) be the lower and upper mixtures of ((yk); (zk)), respectively,
and let x and x be their respective limits. For every adaptive dynamic (x(k)) in Γ,
1. For every N , there is KN such that for all k ≥ KN , x(k) ∈ [xN , xN ].
2. x  lim inf x(k)  lim sup x(k)  x.
Moreover, if each player has a finite strategy space, then there is K∗ such that for every
k ≥ K∗, x  x(k)  x.
16In other words, x0 = infX , x0 = supX , and for k ≥ 1, xk = g(xk−1), and xk = g(xk−1).
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Proof. Statement (1) holds trivially for N = 0. Suppose there is KN−1 such that for all
k ≥ KN−1, x(k) ∈ [xN−1, xN−1]. Then for all k ≥ KN−1, [inf P (KN−1, k), supP (KN−1, k)] ⊂
[xN−1, xN−1]. Now, by definition of an adaptive dynamic, letKN be such that for all k ≥ KN ,
x(k) ∈ U [inf P (KN−1, k), supP (KN−1, k)], and consequently, for all k ≥ KN ,
x(k) ∈ U [inf P (KN−1, k), supP (KN−1, k)] ⊂ U [xN−1, xN−1] = [g(xN−1), g(xN−1)] = [xN , xN ],
where the inclusion follows from the monotonicity of U , and the first equality follows from
lemma 1. Statement (2) follows immediately, because x = limN x
N and x = limN x
N .
Lemmas 1 through 3 help formalize one of the main results in this paper.
Theorem 1. In GSS, the following are equivalent.
1. Best response dynamic starting at infX (or supX) converges
2. Every adaptive dynamic converges to the same Nash equilibrium
3. Every adaptive dynamic converges to a Nash equilibrium
Moreover, in each case, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We need only check that (1) implies (2). Let (yk) be the best response dynamic
starting at infX. Then (y2k) is a subsequence of the convergent sequence (xk) and (y2k+1)
is a subsequence of the convergent sequence (xk), and therefore, if (yk) converges, then x =
x. Moreover, x ∈ g(x), because if x 6∈ g(x), then there is i, and xi such that f i(xi, x−i) −
f i(xi, x−i) > 0. But then, by upper semi-continuity in the i variable, and continuity in the
−i variables, for all k sufficiently large, f i(xi, xk−i) − f i(xk+1i , xk−i) > 0, contradicting the
optimality of xk+1i . Consequently, x is a Nash equilibrium. The previous lemma now implies
that every adaptive dynamic converges to this Nash equilibrium. The proof is similar for
the best response dynamic starting at supX.
If every adaptive dynamic converges to the same Nash equilibrium, the game has a unique
Nash equilibrium. For if there were two distinct Nash equilibria, then consider the following
two constant sequences; each playing one of the Nash equilibria. These are two adaptive
dynamics converging to distinct Nash equilibria, a contradiction.
Theorem 1 provides a new perspective on global stability. Say that a strategic game Γ
is globally stable, if it has a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium such that every adaptive
dynamic converges to this Nash equilibrium.17 Intuitively, in a globally stable game, all
adaptive learning dynamics and strategic processes always lead to the same outcome. The-
orem 1 says that in GSS, convergence of the best response dynamic from inf (or sup) of the
strategy space is equivalent to global stability.18
Theorem 1 shows that in GSS, global stability can be analyzed using a single best response
dynamic, as an alternative to the traditional eigen-value approach; confer, for example, Al-
Nowaihi and Levine (1985) and Okuguchi and Yamazaki (2008). Recall that eigen-value
17As shown in the proof of theorem 1, if a game is globally stable, then it has a unique Nash equilibrium.
18In GSC, theorem 1 is not necessarily true. Indeed, in GSC, part (1) of theorem 1 is always true.
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analysis requires making assumptions about each dynamic being analyzed. Theorem 1,
however, yields convergence of all adaptive dynamics from knowledge of convergence of a
single best response dynamic. Consequently, whether players actually play best response
dynamics or not, convergence of a single best response dynamic is sufficient to conclude
convergence under all adaptive behavior.
Theorem 1 helps provide a connection to existing results on dominance solvability in
GSS, as follows. Recall that Zimper (2007) has shown that when each player i’s payoff
function is supermodular in xi and has decreasing differences in (xi; x−i), and when for
each player i, there exists an order-continuous best response function, a GSS always has
extremal serially undominated strategies, and a GSS is dominance solvable iff the second
iterate of the (joint) best response function has a unique fixed point. The model we use
here is more general. Payoff functions here are more general: quasi-supermodular in xi and
satisfy the decreasing single crossing property in (xi; x−i).
19 Moreover, we make assumptions
on the primitive payoff functions, not on best responses. Furthermore, we do not make the
implicit assumptions of convex strategy spaces and strictly quasi-concave payoffs to guarantee
uniqueness of best responses; we work with best response correspondences.
In the next result, we show that Zimper’s results (existence of extremal serially undomi-
nated strategies and equivalences 1-3 in theorem 2 below) go through for our generalizations.
The proof is given in the appendix.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a GSS, x and x be the extremal serially undominated strategies, and
g be the joint best-response correspondence. The following are equivalent.
1. Γ is dominance solvable
2. x = x
3. g ◦ g has a unique fixed point
4. Best response dynamic starting at infX (or supX) converges
Moreover, in each case, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Combining theorems 1 and 2 yields the following connection.
Corollary 1. In GSS, the following are equivalent.
1. Best response dynamic starting at infX (or supX) converges
2. The game is globally stable
3. The game is dominance solvable
19The decreasing single crossing property is an ordinal generalization of decreasing differences.
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In particular, in GSS, both dominance solvability and global stability can be checked
using a single best response dynamic.
Corollary 1 brings together two different foundations for robustness of predicted outcomes
in games, in terms of convergence of a single best response dynamic. Dominance solvability
(and rationalizability) assumes fully informed players, using infinite iterations of rationalizing
about potential (future) responses by competitors to predict a solution to a one-shot game.
Global stability uses dynamic learning and strategic processes in a series of game-play over
time, using past play by typically myopic players to determine present moves, and relying on
limits of such learning and strategic behavior to predict an outcome robust to the dynamics.
In GSS, both approaches are equivalent, and moreover, these equivalences are accessible from
knowledge of convergence of a single best response dynamic.20
Recall that Moulin (1984) has shown that in all strategic games, dominance solvability
implies Cournot stability (convergence of all best response dynamics). Zimper (2007)’s
results imply that in GSS, Cournot stability is equivalent to dominance solvability. Our
results extend this to show that in GSS, global stability (convergence of every adaptive
dynamic, not just best response dynamics) is equivalent to dominance solvability.
Fixed points of g◦g play a significant role in the analysis of GSS. These may be motivated
in terms of strategy profiles that are rationalizable with short cycles of justification, in the
spirit of Bernheim (1984). That is, suppose x ∈ g ◦ g(x). In this case, let y ∈ g(x) such
that x ∈ g(y). Then the profile of strategies x is rationalizable with the following cycle of
conjectures. For each i, player i plays xi because she believes her opponents shall play y−i,
because each of her opponents j further believes that his opponents shall play x−j . Say that
a profile of strategies x is simply rationalizable, if there is a strategy profile y such that
for every player i, xi can be justified by such a short cycle of conjectures.
The reasoning above shows that if a profile of strategies x is a fixed point of g ◦ g, then
it is simply rationalizable. In the other direction, it is easy to check that if for each i, player
i plays xi because that is a best response to her belief that her opponents shall play y−i,
because each of her opponents j best responds with yj based on his further belief that his
opponents shall play x−j , then the profile of strategies x is a (joint) best response to the
profile of strategies y, and y is a best response to x, whence x is a fixed point of g ◦ g.
Thus, we may view fixed points of g ◦ g as strategy profiles that can be (simultaneously)
rationalized by no more than two iterations of behavioral conjectures.
Intuitively, simply rationalizable strategies do not rely on high orders of deduction. They
may be viewed as outcomes of low-level rationalization, exhibiting a type of bounded ratio-
nality. Nash equilibria are simply rationalizable (x and y are the same), but in general, simply
20Using Milgrom and Roberts (1990), it is easy to see that as stated, the equivalence of parts (2) and (3)
of corollary 1 is true for GSC as well. What is not true for GSC is the equivalence of (1) and (2), and the
equivalence of (1) and (3)). In particular, in GSC, the best response dynamic from inf (respectively, sup) of
the strategy space always converges to the smallest (respectively, largest) Nash equilibrium, and therefore, in
GSC, convergence of either (or even both) best response dynamic does not necessarily imply global stability
or dominance solvability.
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rationalizable strategies may include more strategies than Nash strategies.21 Moreover, sim-
ply rationalizable strategies may form only a strict subset of all rationalizable strategies,
because rationalizable strategies include conjectural cycles of all orders.22
In this terminology, in GSS, simple rationalization always predicts an outcome (even
if a GSS has no Nash equilibrium). Moreover, if simple rationalization predicts a unique
outcome, then higher-level rationalization has no additional benefit.
3 Applications
Combining the equivalences in theorem 1, theorem 2, and corollary 1 allow for powerful
cross-derivation of results. For example, if it is easy to know that a GSS has a unique
profile of simply rationalizable strategies, then we may conclude that the game is globally
stable, and every adaptive dynamic converges to the unique equilibrium. Similarly, if we can
compute the convergence of the best-response dynamic from the inf (or sup) of the strategy
space, we may conclude that the game is globally stable, and it is dominance solvable. A
direct computation of best-response dynamics may be useful in other cases. The following
applications explore these ideas.
Example 2 (Simple Cournot oligopoly). Consider a 3-firm Cournot oligopoly with
linear inverse demand, p = a − b(x1 + x2 + x3), constant marginal cost, c > 0, and with
production capacity constrained to [0, xmax] for each firm. For range of the best-responses
to be in the strategy space, suppose xmax = a−c
2b
. In this case, the joint best response
function is given by g(x1, x2, x3) = (
a−c−b(x2+x3)
2b
,
a−c−b(x1+x3)
2b
,
a−c−b(x1+x2)
2b
), and the unique
Nash equilibrium is given by (x1, x2, x3) = (
a−c
4b
, a−c
4b
, a−c
4b
). Moreover, g ◦ g(x1, x2, x3) =
(2x1+x2+x3
4
, x1+2x2+x3
4
, x1+x2+2x3
4
), and it is easy to see that every point on the diagonal of
[0, xmax]3 is a fixed point of g ◦ g. In particular, (0, 0, 0) is the smallest simply rationalizable
strategy and (a−c
2b
, a−c
2b
, a−c
2b
) is the largest. Thus, this game is neither globally stable, nor
Cournot stable, nor dominance solvable.23 In fact, the best-response dynamic starting at
(0, 0, 0) cycles with (a−c
2b
, a−c
2b
, a−c
2b
), and serially undominated strategies provide no help in
narrowing the range of predicted outcomes.
Notice that in this example, the (joint) best response function is linear (technically, it is
affine, but deferring to standard terminology, we term it linear). As linear best responses
arise in other contexts, too, the next example provides a general result for this case.
21Zimper (2007) provides an example of a three-player, three-action GSS with a unique Nash equilibrium,
but with at least two simply rationalizable strategy profiles. A simple, textbook Cournot oligopoly example
is provided in example 2 below.
22Indeed, in the original example in Bernheim (1984), there are rationalizable strategies that are not simply
rationalizable. Our approach may be extended to define order-n rationalizable strategies as fixed points of
the n-th iterate of g. Order-1 strategies are Nash profiles, order-2 strategies are simply rationalizable, and
so on. We need only order-2 strategies in this paper, and mention their behavioral properties. Higher order
rationalizability is not needed for this paper, and is not explored here.
23Recall that Zimper (2007) provides an example of a three-player, three-action GSS with a unique Nash
equilibrium, and in which every strategy profile is serially undominated.
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Example 3 (Linear best responses). Consider a GSS with finitely many players, N ,
where each X i = [0, xmaxi ] ⊂ R, and X = [0, xmax] ⊂ RN .24 Suppose the joint best response
function is affine; that is g : X → X such that g(x) = a + Bx, where each component of
the N × N matrix B is non-positive. Thus, g is nonincreasing. Moreover, for range of g
to be in X, suppose −Bxmax ≤ a ≤ xmax. Notice that the game has a unique equilibrium,
if, and only if, the matrix (I − B) is invertible. In this case, the unique equilibrium is
x∗ = (I − B)−1a. The iterated best response is given by g ◦ g(x) = a + Ba + B2x, and
therefore, g ◦ g has a unique fixed point, if, and only if, the matrix (I −B2) is invertible. As
determinant calculations are easy to make, this result is useful in applications. Consider the
following examples.
Example 3-1 (Cournot oligopoly; linear demand, linear cost). The 3-firm Cournot
oligopoly in example 2 is a special case of example 3, with B =


0 −1
2
−1
2
−1
2
0 −1
2
−1
2
−1
2
0

. It is
easy to check that I −B is invertible, but I −B2 is not. Thus, the game has a unique Nash
equilibrium, but is neither globally stable nor dominance solvable.
Example 3-2 (Cournot oligopoly; linear demand, quadratic cost). Consider a 3-firm
Cournot oligopoly with linear inverse demand, as in example 2, but with quadratic cost, cx2i ,
with c > 0, and with production capacity constrained to [0, xmax] for each firm. In this case,
the joint best-response function is given by g(x1, x2, x3) = (
a−b(x2+x3)
2b+2c
,
a−b(x1+x3)
2b+2c
,
a−b(x1+x2)
2b+2c
).
Therefore, B =


0 − b
2b+2c
− b
2b+2c
− b
2b+2c
0 − b
2b+2c
− b
2b+2c
− b
2b+2c
0

. Let ξ = ( b
2b+2c
)2. Then b
2b+2c
< 1
2
implies
ξ < 1
4
. Therefore, det(I−B2) = (1−2ξ)(1−4ξ+ξ2)−2ξ3 > (1−2ξ)ξ2−2ξ3 = ξ2(1−4ξ) > 0.
Consequently, this oligopoly is globally stable, the dominance solution (and several other
solution concepts nested within the dominance solution) predicts a unique outcome, and the
unique Nash equilibrium is robust to all adaptive behavior.
Example 3-3 (Common-pool resource game). Another game that shares the same
structure is the common-pool resource game.25 Consider a 3-player common-pool resource
game. Each player has an endowment w > 0. There are two investment options – a com-
mon resource (such as a fishery) that exhibits diminishing marginal return, and an outside
option with diminishing marginal return. If player i invests an amount xi ≤ w of his en-
dowment into the common resource, he receives a proportional share of the total output
xi
x1+x2+x3
(a(x1 + x2 + x3)− b(x1 + x2 + x3)2), and he receives r(w − xi)− s(w − xi)2 on the
outside investment w − xi.26 Thus, payoff to player i is
f i(x1, x2, x3) = r(w − xi)− s(w − xi)2 + xi
x1 + x2 + x3
(
a(x1 + x2 + x3)− b(x1 + x2 + x3)2
)
,
if x1 + x2 + x3 > 0, and rw − sw2, otherwise. Notice that best response of player i is
given by gi(xj , xk) =
a−r+2sw
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
(xj + xk). For range of g
i to lie in [0, w], we assume
24Here, xmax is the vector with i-th component xmax
i
.
25See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994). Additional analysis of this game as a GSS is
presented in Roy and Sabarwal (2010).
26Here, a, b, r, s > 0.
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a−r
2b
≤ w ≤ a−r
2(b−s) .
27 Matrix B is given by B =


0 − b
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
0 − b
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
− b
2b+2s
0

. As in example
3-2, I − B2 is invertible, the game is globally stable, the unique equilibrium is robust to
all adaptive behavior, and several solution concepts all predict the same unique equilibrium
outcome.
Example 3-4 (Private provision of public goods). Suppose there are finitely many
consumers, indexed i = 1, . . . , N , and there are two goods – good 1 is numeraire, indexed
y, and good 2 is a public good, indexed x, and all variables are measured in terms of the
numeraire (or in units of account). Suppose consumer i’s utility is Cobb-Douglas, given by
ui(yi, x1, . . . , xN) = y
α
i (x1 + . . .+ xN )
β, where α, β > 0. Each consumer’s budget constraint
is yi + xi = wi. Substituting xi − wi for yi, it is easy to calculate that player 1’s best
response function is given by g1(x2, . . . , xN) =
βw1
α+β
− α
α+β
(x2 + . . . + xN ), and similarly for
the other players. To ensure best-responses remain non-negative, we impose the constraint
α(N − 1)wmax ≤ βwi, for each player i. (Here, wmax = maxiwi.) The matrix B is given
by B = 1
α+β


0 −α · · · −α
−α 0 · · · −α
...
...
. . .
...
−α −α · · · 0

. It is easy to check that each entry of B
2 is non-
negative, and moreover, the sum of each row of B2 is ( (N−1)α
α+β
)2, which is strictly less than
one. Therefore,
∑∞
n=0(B
2)n = (I − B2)−1. Consequently, this game is globally stable, and
dominance solvable. A similar example can be worked out with utility given by constant
elasticity of substitution.
Example 3-5 (Differentiated goods Cournot oligopoly). Consider finitely many firms,
indexed i = 1, . . . , N , each facing demand curve pi = α−βxi−δ(x1+. . .+xi−1+xi+1+. . . xN ),
each with constant marginal cost c, and production constrained to [0, xmax]. To introduce
differentiated goods, assume that β 6= δ; that is, the impact of self production on price
is different from the impact of competitor output on price. It is easy to calculate that
firm 1’s best response function is given by g1(x2, . . . , xN) =
α−c
2β
− δ
2β
(x2 + . . . + xN), and
similarly for the other players. To ensure best-responses remain in the strategy space, we
assume that α−c
2β
< xmax and that α − c ≥ (N − 1)δxmax. The matrix B is given by
B = 1
2β


0 −δ · · · −δ
−δ 0 · · · −δ
...
...
. . .
...
−δ −δ · · · 0

. As in the previous example, it is easy to check that each
entry of B2 is non-negative, and moreover, the sum of each row of B2 is ( (N−1)δ
2β
)2, which
is strictly less than one. Therefore,
∑∞
n=0(B
2)n = (I − B2)−1, and this game is globally
stable, and dominance solvable, and every adaptive dynamic converges to the unique Nash
equilibrium. Notice that additional heterogeneity can be introduced in this example by
varying α, β, δ, xmax and c by firm. Moreover, a similar example can be formulated using
quadratic, or more general costs.
27Hence, we need a > r and b > s.
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Applications to games with non-linear best-responses are considered in the following
examples.
Example 4 (Tournaments). Suppose a tournament28 has 3 players, where a reward r > 0
is shared by the players who succeed in the tournament. If one player succeeds, he gets r for
sure, if two players succeed, each gets r with probability one-half, and if all players succeed,
each gets r with probability one-third. Each player chooses effort xi ∈ [0, 1] with probability
of success xi. Expected reward per unit for player i is
pii(xi, xj , xk) = xi(1− xj)(1− xk) + 1
2
xixj(1− xk) + 1
2
xixk(1− xj) + 1
3
xixjxk.
The quadratic cost of effort xi is cx
2
i . The payoff to player i is expected reward minus cost of
effort. That is, f i(xi, xj, xk) = rpi
i(xi, xj, xk)− cx2i . It is easy to calculate that best response
of player i is given by gi(xj , xk) =
r
2c
(1 − 1
2
(xj + xk) +
1
3
xjxk). Suppose, for convenience,
r = 2c.
This game is globally stable, as follows. Notice that if a best response dynamic starts
anywhere on the diagonal in [0, 1]3, then it remains entirely on the diagonal. This reduces
the problem to checking convergence only on the diagonal. Using, x1 = x2 = x3 = x, say,
this reduces the problem to checking if the iterated dynamic given by γ(x) = 1 − x + 1
3
x2
converges. (Here, γ is the best-response of an arbitrary player, reduced to one-dimension,
using symmetry.) Notice that |γ′(x)| = 1 − 2
3
x < 1, if x > 0. Therefore, γ satisfies the
contraction principle over [, 1 + ] for every sufficiently small  > 0. In particular, the
best-response dynamic starting at (1, 1, 1) converges. Consequently, every adaptive dynamic
converges, the game is globally stable, and dominance solvable. (For reference, the unique
globally stable equilibrium is (3−√6, 3−√6, 3−√6).)
Example 5 (General symmetric Cournot oligopoly). Consider a N -firm Cournot
oligopoly, with inverse demand curve given by P (x1+ . . .+xN), cost of firm i given by C(xi),
both these functions are twice continuously differentiable, and production is constrained to
[0, xmax]. Assume that demand is downward sloping and cost is convex. The first-order
condition for firm i is given by xiP
′ + P − C ′ = 0, and therefore, the slope of the best
response of firm i with respect to firm j’s output is given by − xiP ′′+P ′
xiP ′′+2P ′−C′′ . This is a GSS,
if xiP
′′ + P ′ < 0.
As in the tournaments example above, if a best response dynamic starts anywhere on the
diagonal in [0, xmax]N , then it remains entirely on the diagonal. This reduces the problem
to checking convergence only on the diagonal. Write the best-response dynamic implicitly
as yP ′(y + (N − 1)x) + P (y + (N − 1)x)− C ′(y) = 0, where y is the best response to each
competitor playing x. This process is globally asymptotically stable, if
∣∣dy
dx
∣∣ < 1, which is
satisfied if |C ′′−P ′| > (N − 2)|yP ′′+ P ′|. In this case, this game is dominance solvable and
the unique equilibrium is globally stable under all adaptive behavior. This result is valid for
large N , as compared to, for example, Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985).
Let’s apply this result to a specific functional form. As in Amir (1996), suppose inverse
demand is given by P (x1 + . . . + xN ) =
1
(x1+...+xN+1)α
, where α > 0, and cost is given by
28This version is based on Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006). Additional analysis of this game
as a GSS is presented in Roy and Sabarwal (2010).
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C(xi) =
1
2
cx2i . In this case, best responses are downward sloping, if 0 < α <
1
xmax
. Moreover,
the condition |C ′′ − P ′| > (N − 2)|yP ′′ + P ′| is automatically satisfied for N = 2, 3. More
generally, it is satisfied, if c > (N − 3)α. Thus, the best response dynamic on the diagonal
converges, if α < min
{
c
N−3 ,
1
xmax
}
. In particular, if we normalize production so that xmax = 1,
then the condition holds for 0 < α < 1, and c > N − 3. Notice that this result is valid for
large N , as compared to, for example, Al-Nowaihi and Levine (1985).
Example 6 (Two-player GSS). For two-player GSS, global stability is equivalent to
uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, as follows. It is known that in a two-player GSS, domi-
nance solvability is equivalent to uniqueness of Nash equilibrium, because a two-player GSS
can be viewed as a GSC by reversing the order on the strategy space of one of the players.
Corollary 1 then yields the desired equivalence.29
Example 7 (Two-player GSC). Notice that a two-player GSC may be viewed as a GSS
by reversing the order on the strategy space of one of the players. Therefore, the results
here apply to such games. In particular, (in the original order in a two-player GSC,) if the
best-response dynamic starting from (infX1, supX2) (or from (supX1, infX2)) converges,
then the game is globally stable, and dominance solvable. Similarly, if a two-player GSC has
a unique Nash equilibrium, it is globally stable.
In some games (especially discrete games), it may be easy to carry out a direct compu-
tation of best response dynamics, as shown in the next example.
Example 8 (Dove-Hawk-Chicken-2). Consider the Dove-Hawk-Chicken game (example
1), but with slightly modified payoffs given in figure 2. The only modification is that in the
top row of each matrix, player 2’s payoffs are flipped. This results inD as the dominant action
for player 2. Intuitively, player 2 is a type that prefers less conflict (or avoids aggression, or
would prefer a more “cooperative” action).
D H D H
D 10, 20, 10 0, 10, 10 D 10, 10, 20 10, 0, 0
H 20, 10, 0 10, 0, 10 H 0, 10, 10 0, 0, 0
D H
P
la
y
er
 1
<------- Player 3 ------->
Player 2 Player 2
Figure 2: Dove-Hawk-Chicken-2
It is easy to check that (D,D,H) is the unique equilibrium in this game. Moreover, the
best response dynamic starting from (D,D,D) converges after two iterations: (D,D,D) 7→
29As shown above, this result does not extend to games with more than two players; Zimper (2007)
provides a three-player, three-action counter-example, and the 3-firm Cournot oligopoly with linear demand
and constant marginal cost (example 2) provides a counter-example. Similarly, although a Nash equilibrium
is guaranteed in a 2-player GSS, existence of equilibrium does not extend to more than two players, as shown
in the Dove-Hawk-Chicken game (example 1).
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(H,D,H) 7→ (D,D,H). Consequently, this game is dominance solvable, and the unique
equilibrium is globally stable under all adaptive behavior.
The connections shown in this paper provide several equivalent techniques to check for
robustness of equilibrium predictions in GSS. Uniqueness of simply rationalizable strategies
may be easy to check in games with linear best responses, convergence of best response
dynamics may be easy to check in cases with non-linear best responses, especially in the
presence of some symmetry, and a direct computation of best response dynamics may be
useful in discrete games.
Notice that specialized results are possible in particular situations. For example, as shown
in Jensen (2009), in strictly quasi-concave aggregative games with strategic substitutes, with
one-dimensional strategy sets, and with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, sequential
best-reply dynamics converge to the unique Nash equilibrium.30 As sequential best reply
dynamics are adaptive dynamics, this result shows that in particular cases, a subset of the
set of adaptive dynamics may be well-behaved. Such a result is useful, if we have in mind
particular subclasses of dynamics and wish to determine if these are well-behaved.
4 Stability of Monotone Equilibrium Selections
To formalize ideas of dynamic stability of equilibria in parameterized games with strategic
substitutes, we need some notions about best response dynamics starting at arbitrary points
in the strategy space.
Let Γ be a GSS, and y  z be elements of X. The (simultaneous) best response
dynamic-1 starting at y is the sequence (yk)∞k=0, where y
0 = y, and for k ≥ 1, yk = g(yk−1)
if n is even, and yk = g(yk−1) if n is odd. Similarly, the (simultaneous) best response
dynamic-2 starting at z is the sequence (zk)∞k=0, where z
0 = z, and for k ≥ 1, zk = g(zk−1)
if n is even, and zk = g(zk−1) if n is odd. Notice that when y = infX, best response
dynamic-1 is the best response dynamic starting at infX, and when z = supX, best response
dynamic-2 is the best response dynamic starting at supX. Moreover, both best response
dynamics coincide when g is a function and y = z.
Given y  z and best response dynamics 1 and 2, (yk) and (zk), the definition of the
lower and upper mixtures of ((yk); (zk)) remains the same; (xk)∞k=0 is given by x
k = yk, if k
is even, and xk = zk, if k is odd, and (xk)∞k=0 is given by x
k = zk, if k is even, and xk = yk,
if k is odd.
The definition of an adaptive dynamic is similar. Following Echenique (2002), a process
(x(k))∞k=0 is an adaptive dynamic in the game Γ if there is γ > 0 such that for all k ≥ 0,
x(k) ∈ U [inf P (k − γ, k), supP (k − γ, k)], where as earlier, P (k − γ, k) is the history of
past play from k − γ to k; that is, P (k − γ, k) = {x(k − γ), x(k − γ + 1), . . . , x(k − 1)}. By
convention, when γ ≥ k, we set k − γ = 0. It is easy to check that this is a special case of
our earlier definition, using discrete time and a uniform bound on the length of history to
30Jensen (2009)’s result does not extend to simultaneous best-reply dynamics, as shown by the Cournot
oligopoly with linear demand and linear cost (example 2) above.
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affect a current decision.31
The following lemma presents a generalization of lemma 3. Its proof is given in the
appendix. The proof builds on techniques from Echenique (2002), adjusted for the special
challenges that arise when dealing with strategic substitutes.
Lemma 4. Let y  z, (yk) and (zk) be best response dynamics 1 and 2, respectively, and
(xk) and (xk) be their lower and upper mixtures, respectively. For every x0 ∈ [y, z], and for
every adaptive dynamic (x(k)) starting at x0, the following is true.
1. For every N , there is KN , such that for all k ≥ KN , x(k) ∈ [xN , xN ].
2. If y0  y2, then there exist simply rationalizable y, y such that
y  lim inf x(k)  lim sup x(k)  y.
3. If z2  z0, then there exist simply rationalizable z, z such that
z  lim inf x(k)  lim sup x(k)  z.
Notice the initial monotonicity condition in parts 2 and 3. These conditions are auto-
matically satisfied when y0 = infX and z0 = supX, as was the case earlier, but may not
necessarily be satisfied more generally. Below, we shall consider and motivate cases when
these initial monotonicity conditions are satisfied.
Parameterized games with strategic substitutes are defined as follows. As earlier, consider
a set of players I, and for each player i, a partially ordered strategy space (X i,i), and the
overall strategy space X.
Moreover, consider a partially ordered set of parameters, T .32 We restrict the parameter
space to satisfy a basic “density” property; that is, we assume that for every order interval
[t, t] in T and for every tˆ such that t ≺ tˆ ≺ t, every neighborhood of tˆ contains t0, t1 ∈ [t, t]
such that t0 ≺ tˆ ≺ t1. Notice that this property is fairly basic. In particular, a convex
T ⊂ Rn, as assumed in Echenique (2002), is admissible. This property rules out parameter
spaces where order intervals contain isolated points.
Each player i has a payoff function, f i : X × T → R, denoted f i(xi, x−i, t). The col-
lection Γ = (I, T, (X i,i, f i)i∈I) is a parameterized game with strategic substitutes,
(parameterized GSS), if for every player i,
• (X i,i) is a complete lattice,
• For every (x−i, t), f i is order upper semi-continuous in xi, and for every xi, f i is order
continuous in (x−i, t),
31This specialization is helpful in generalizing lemma 3. See the double-induction argument in the proof
of lemma 4.
32For convenience, the partial order on T is denoted by the same symbol, , and T is assumed to have
the standard order interval topology.
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• For every (x−i, t), f i is quasi-supermodular in xi,
• For every x−i, f i satisfies single-crossing property in (xi; t), and
• For every t, f i satisfies decreasing single-crossing property in (xi; x−i).
As usual, single-crossing property in (xi; t) implies that each player’s best response,
gi(x−i, t) is nondecreasing in the parameter, a standard formulation. As earlier, each player’s
best response is nonincreasing in other player strategies. Thus, the joint best response, g(x, t)
is nondecreasing in t and nonincreasing in x.
As usual, for each t ∈ T , a parameterized GSS, Γ, naturally defines a GSS, Γ(t), with the
same strategy spaces as Γ and with appropriate sections of the payoff functions. Let E(t)
denote the set of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria in Γ(t).
An equilibrium selection is a function e : T → X such that for every t, e(t) ∈ E(t).
An equilibrium selection e : T → X is nowhere weakly increasing on [t, t], if for every
t0, t1 ∈
[
t, t
]
, t0 ≺ t1 implies e(t0) 6 e(t1).33 An equilibrium selection e : T → X is strictly
increasing if it is nondecreasing and for every t0 ≺ tˆ ≺ t1, [e(t0), e(t1)] is a neighborhood
of e(tˆ) in X.34 For notational convenience, we sometimes denote g(·, t) as gt(·).
As is well-known, parameterized GSS do not necessarily exhibit monotone comparative
statics, and therefore, nondecreasing equilibrium selections do not necessarily exist in such
games. Roy and Sabarwal (2010) provide intuitive conditions that guarantee monotone
comparative statics in parameterized GSS, as follows.
Let Γ be a parameterized GSS. An equilibrium selection e : T → X satisfies condition 1
on
[
t, t
]
, if for every t0, tˆ in
[
t, t
]
such that t0  tˆ, e(t0)  g(g(e(t0), tˆ), tˆ). An equilibrium
selection e : T → X satisfies condition 2 on [t, t], if for every tˆ, t1 in
[
t, t
]
such that tˆ  t1,
g(g(e(t1), tˆ), tˆ)  e(t1).
As shown in Roy and Sabarwal (2010), in GSS, conditions 1 and 2 present a natural
tradeoff between a direct parameter effect and an indirect strategic substitute effect, as
follows. Suppose g is a function. Starting from an existing equilibrium, e(t0) at t = t0,
an increase in t to tˆ has two effects on, say, player i’s best response function, gi(·, ·). The
direct parameter effect is an increase in gi, because best-response is nondecreasing in t. The
indirect strategic substitute effect is a decrease in gi, because an increase in t increases the
best response of the competitors of i, and their actions are strict substitutes for player i.
Thus, e(t0)  g(g(e(t0), tˆ), tˆ) in condition 1 says that for each player, the indirect strategic
substitute effect does not dominate the direct parameter effect when the parameter goes up.
Condition 2 makes the analogous statement when the parameter goes down.35
33As described in Echenique (2002), this is stronger than the negation of weakly increasing.
34WhenX is in some finite dimensional Euclidean space, as in Echenique (2002), this definition is equivalent
to t0 ≺ t1 ⇒ e(t0)  e(t1). Another relevant case is when X is a subset of a Banach lattice that has a
positive cone with a nonempty interior.
35For GSS, Roy and Sabarwal (2010) present conditions on payoff functions and on best responses under
which the above conditions hold. Notice that in GSC, both effects work in the same direction. Therefore,
once the direct parameter effect is assumed to be favorable, (as formalized, for example, by a strict single
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Conditions 1 and 2 are useful to apply lemma 4, as follows. Consider t0  tˆ. If condition
1 is satisfied, then the best response dynamic-1 given by y0 = e(t0), and for k ≥ 1, yk =
g(yk−1, tˆ) if n is even, and yk = g(yk−1, tˆ) if n is odd has the feature that y0  y2. Similarly,
consider tˆ  t1. If condition 2 is satisfied then the best response dynamic-2 given by z0 =
e(t1), and for k ≥ 1, zk = g(zk−1, tˆ) if n is odd, and zk = g(zk−1, tˆ) if n is even has the
feature that z2  z0. This allows us to use lemma 4.
To state and prove an analogue of the correspondence principle for GSS, consider the
following notions of stability. Let Γ be a parameterized GSS and t ∈ T . A point xˆ ∈ X is
weakly stable at t, if there is a neighborhood V of xˆ such that for every x ∈ V , there is
an adaptive dynamic (x(k)) in Γ(t) that starts at x and converges to xˆ. A point xˆ ∈ X is
strongly stable at t, if there is a neighborhood V of xˆ such that for every x ∈ V , every
adaptive dynamic (x(k)) in Γ(t) that starts at x converges to xˆ. For notational convenience,
we sometimes denote g(·, t) as gt(·).
Theorem 3. (Correspondence Principle) Let Γ be a parameterized GSS and e be a
continuous equilibrium selection.
(1) If e is nowhere weakly increasing and satisfies condition 1 on
[
t, t
]
, then for every tˆ such
that t ≺ tˆ ≺ t, e(tˆ) is not weakly stable at tˆ.
(2) If e is strictly increasing and satisfies conditions 1 and 2 on
[
t, t
]
, then for every tˆ such
that t ≺ tˆ ≺ t and e(tˆ) is an isolated fixed point of gtˆ ◦ gtˆ, e(tˆ) is strongly stable at tˆ.
Proof. Consider (1). Fix tˆ such that t ≺ tˆ ≺ t. Consider e(tˆ), and an arbitrary neighborhood
V of e(tˆ). By continuity of e, let t0 be such that t  t0 ≺ tˆ and e(t0) ∈ V . Then, by
nowhere weakly increasing, e(t0) 6 e(tˆ). Consider an arbitrary adaptive dynamic (x(k))
in Γ(tˆ) starting at x(0) = e(t0). Let y
0 = e(t0) and for k ≥ 1, yk = g tˆ(yk−1) if n is
even, and yk = g tˆ(y
k−1) if n is odd. By condition 1, y0  y2. Therefore, by lemma 4,
e(t0)  y  lim inf x(k), whence x(k) 6→ e(tˆ).
Consider (2). Fix tˆ such that t ≺ tˆ ≺ t and e(tˆ) is an isolated fixed point of gtˆ ◦ gtˆ. Let N
be a neighborhood of e(tˆ) such that N ∩ E(tˆ) = {e(tˆ)}. As e is continuous, let t0, t1 ∈
[
t, t
]
be such that t0 ≺ tˆ ≺ t1, and e(t0) and e(t1) are in N . As e is strictly increasing, [e(t0), e(t1)]
is a neighborhood of e(tˆ). Consequently, V = [e(t0), e(t1)]∩N is a neighborhood of e(tˆ) and
e(tˆ) is the only fixed point of gtˆ ◦ gtˆ in V .
Fix x0 ∈ V arbitrarily, and let (x(k)) be an arbitrary adaptive dynamic in Γ(tˆ) starting
at x0. Let (yk) and (zk) be best response dynamics 1 and 2, respectively, with y0 = e(t0)
and z0 = e(t1). Using conditions 1 and 2, and lemma 4, it follows that
e(t0) = y
0  y  lim inf x(k)  lim sup x(k)  z  z0 = e(t1),
whence y and z are in [e(t0), e(t1)]. As y and z are fixed points of gtˆ ◦ gtˆ, by local isolation,
y = z = e(tˆ). Thus, x(k)→ e(tˆ), as desired.
Theorem 3 provides conditions under which strict monotone comparative statics select
equilibria that are dynamically stable, in the sense that for small changes in the parameter, at
crossing property in (xi; t),) the indirect strategic complement effect serves to reinforce the direct effect, and
the conditions above are satisfied.
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a new parameter value, every adaptive dynamic starting from the old equilibrium converges
to the newly selected equilibrium. Moreover, nowhere increasing selections select equilibria
that are dynamically unstable, in the sense that at a new parameter value, no adaptive
dynamic starting from the old equilibrium converges to the newly selected equilibrium. Thus,
when considering dynamically stable equilibria (as proposed by Samuelson’s Correspondence
principle), we may expect monotone selections of equilibria to arise naturally in GSS.
Notice that Echenique (2002) shows these results for parameterized GSC without using
conditions 1 and 2, but implicitly assuming a strict single-crossing property (correspondences
are assumed to be strongly increasing in t). The results here show the importance of focusing
on an appropriate tradeoff between the direct parameter effect and the indirect strategic
effect rather than on a strict single-crossing property. As described above, for parameterized
GSC, a strict single-crossing property leads to a strong direct parameter effect, and the
indirect effect does not matter anymore, because it serves to reinforce the direct effect. For
parameterized GSS, it is precisely the reversed nature of the indirect strategic substitute
effect that requires conditions 1 and 2 to be useful in proving the analogous results. Indeed,
in this case, we do not require a strict single-crossing property and correspondences are not
assumed to be strongly increasing in t.
Example 9 (Team projects with substitutable tasks). Suppose a project is to be
accomplished by a team of 3 players,36 each choosing task (or effort) xi ∈ [0, 1], with prob-
ability of success xi and quadratic cost of effort
c
2
x2i , with c > 0. Tasks are substitutable
in the sense that each player by herself can make the project successful. The probability
of success is 1 − (1 − x1)(1 − x2)(1 − x3). If the project is successful, player i receives
a parameterized reward r(t) > 0 (with t ∈ T , a compact, convex order interval in R,
and r′(t) > 0.)37 Otherwise, the player receives zero. Therefore, the payoff to player i is
f i(x1, x2, x3, t) = r(t)(1− (1− x1)(1− x2)(1− x3))− c2x2i .
The best response of player i is gi(xj , xk, t) =
r(t)
c
(1 − xj)(1 − xk). For notational con-
venience, let a(t) = r(t)
c
, and when convenient, we suppress the notation t. To ensure that
best responses remain in the strategy space, we assume that a ≤ 1 (for every t). In fact, we
assume that a < 3
4
, the reason becoming clear below.
For each t, this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium, which is strictly increasing in
t, as follows. Fix t. First, observe that in any equilibrium, no player plays 0 or 1, as follows.
Suppose, x1 = 1 in equilibrium. Then using player 2’s and 3’s best response function,
x2 = x3 = 0, whence, x1 = a < 1, a contradiction. Similarly, x2 6= 1 and x3 6= 1. Suppose
x1 = 0 in equilibrium. Then using player 1’s best response function, either x2 = 1 or x3 = 1,
but that contradicts x2 6= 1 and x3 6= 1. Second, observe that only symmetric equilibria (each
player plays the same action) are possible, as follows. Suppose, in equilibrium, x1 > x2. Then
using player 1’s best response, x1+ax2−ax2x3 = a−ax3, and using player 2’s best response,
x2+ax1−ax1x3 = a−ax3, whence (1−a)(x1−x2) = a(x2x3−x1x3), a contradiction. Thus
36This version is based on Dubey, Haimanko, and Zapechelnyuk (2006).
37The parameter t can be viewed as technological improvement, or subsidy provided, or reward provided to
induce an increase in effort (or probability) of task completion. As shown in the example, the best response
function depends on r(t)
ci
, where ci measures player i’s costs, and therefore, r(t) can be viewed as a reward
enhancement parameter relative to a player’s costs.
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x1 = x2. Similarly, x2 = x3. Third, observe that a symmetric equilibrium exists, and is given
by 2a+1−
√
4a+1
2a
for each player. Fourth, as shown by Roy and Sabarwal (2008) symmetric
equilibria in GSS are unique, so this game has a unique equilibrium. Finally, it is easy to
check that this equilibrium selection is strictly increasing in t.
Consequently, this equilibrium selection is strictly increasing and selects locally isolated
equilibria.
Let’s check that conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied. Fix t0 in the interior of T , and let x
∗
denote the equilibrium selection at t0. Notice that for t ≥ t0, γ(x∗, t) = a(t)(1− x∗)2, where
γ is the best-response of a player, reduced to one-dimension, using symmetry. Therefore,
γ(γ(x∗, t), t) = a(t)[1 − a(t)
a(t0)
a(t0)(1 − x∗)2]2 = a(t)[1 − a(t)a(t0)x∗]2, where the last equality
follows from x∗ = a(t0)(1 − x∗)2. Using a′ > 0 and x∗ < 1, it is easy to check that
d
dt
γ(γ(x∗, t), t)
∣∣
t=t0
> 0, if, and only if, x∗ < 1
3
. Using x∗ = 2a+1−
√
4a+1
2a
, this condition is
satisfied when a < 3
4
, as assumed above. Consequently, for every t0 in the interior of T ,
there is a neighborhood
[
t, t
] ⊂ T of t0 such that conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied on
[
t, t
]
.
Applying the theorem above, for every t0 in the interior of T , e(t0) is strongly stable.
A similar example can be constructed using tournaments as well.
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Appendix
Lemma. Let Γ be a GSS. Let ((yk); (zk)) be the best response dynamics starting at infX and
supX, respectively, and let x and x be the limits of the lower and upper mixtures of ((yk); (zk)),
respectively. Then x and x are the smallest and largest profiles of serially undominated strategies,
respectively.
Proof. Let U0(X) = X, and for k ≥ 1, let Uk(X) = U(Uk−1(X)), where U(S) is the collection of
undominated responses to S. It follows by induction that for k ≥ 0, Uk(X) ⊂ [xk, xk], as follows.
This holds trivially for k = 0. Suppose it holds for k − 1. Then for k,
Uk(X) = U(Uk−1(X)) ⊂ U [xk−1, xk−1] ⊂ [g(xk−1), g(xk−1)] = [xk, xk],
where the first inclusion follows from the inductive hypothesis and monotonicity of U , and the
second inclusion follows from lemma 1. Consequently,
∞⋂
k=0
Uk(X) ⊂ [x, x]. That is, the set of
serially undominated strategies is contained in the order interval [x, x].
Notice now that x is a best response to x, and x is a best response to x. That is, x ∈ g(x) and
x ∈ g(x), as follows. Suppose x 6∈ g(x). Then there is i, and xi such that f i(xi, x−i)−f i(xi, x−i) > 0.
But then, by upper semi-continuity in the i variable, and continuity in the −i variables, for all k
sufficiently large, f i(xi, x
k
−i) − f i(xk+1i , xk−i) > 0, contradicting the optimality of xk+1i . Similarly,
x ∈ g(x).
Finally, note that x and x are in
∞⋂
k=0
Uk(X), as follows. Trivially, x and x are in U0(X). Suppose
x and x are in Uk(X). Then x ∈ Uk+1(X), because x ∈ Uk(X) and x is a best response to x,
and x ∈ Uk+1(X), because x ∈ Uk(X) and x is a best response to x. Thus, serially undominated
strategies lie in [x, x], and the end points are extremal serially undominated strategies.
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a GSS, x and x be the extremal serially undominated strategies, and g
be the joint best-response correspondence. The following are equivalent.
1. Γ is dominance solvable
2. x = x
3. g ◦ g has a unique fixed point
4. Best response dynamic from infX (or supX) converges
Moreover, in each case, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let FP (g◦g) denote the set of fixed point of g◦g, and notice that FP (g◦g) ⊂
∞⋂
k=0
Uk(X),
as follows. Consider an arbitrary x ∈ g ◦ g(x). Let y ∈ g(x) be such that x ∈ g(y). Then, by
induction, x and y are in
∞⋂
k=0
Uk(X), as follows. Trivially, x and y are in U0(X). Suppose x
and y are in Uk(X). Then x ∈ Uk+1(X), because y ∈ Uk(X) and x is a best response to y,
and y ∈ Uk+1(X), because x ∈ Uk(X) and y is a best response to x. Consequently, we have the
following relationships: E ⊂ FP (g ◦ g) ⊂
∞⋂
k=0
Uk(X) ⊂ [x, x].
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Notice next that both x and x are fixed points of g ◦ g, because x ∈ g(x) and x ∈ g(x). With
this observation, (3) implies (2) implies (1) follows immediately. For (1) implies (3), notice that
if the game is dominance solvable, then the serially undominated strategies x and x are the same,
and the chain of inclusions above shows that g ◦ g has a unique fixed point. The equivalence of (2)
and (4) is shown in the text; confer lemma 3, and the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma 4. Let y  z, (yk) and (zk) be best response dynamics 1 and 2, respectively, and (xk) and
(xk) be their lower and upper mixtures, respectively. For every x0 ∈ [y, z], and for every adaptive
dynamic (x(k)) starting at x0, the following is true.
1. For every N , there is KN , such that for all k ≥ KN , x(k) ∈ [xN , xN ].
2. If y0  y2, then there exist simply rationalizable y, y such that
y  lim inf x(k)  lim supx(k)  y.
3. If z2  z0, then there exist simply rationalizable z, z such that
z  lim inf x(k)  lim supx(k)  z.
Proof. To prove statement (1), consider N = 0. Let K0 = 0. Notice that x(0) = x
0 ∈ [y0, z0],
by assumption, and [y0, z0] = [x0, x0], by construction. Suppose for 0 ≤ k ≤ kˆ − 1, x(k) ∈ [x0, x0].
Then P (0, kˆ) ⊂ [x0, x0], whence
x(kˆ) ∈ U [inf P (kˆ − γ, kˆ), supP (kˆ − γ, kˆ)]
⊂ U [inf P (0, kˆ), supP (0, kˆ)]
⊂ U [x0, x0] ⊂ [x0, x0],
where membership follows from definition of an adaptive dynamic, the first inclusion follows from
P (kˆ − γ, kˆ) ⊂ P (0, kˆ) and monotonicity of U , the second inclusion follows from the inductive
hypothesis and monotonicity of U , and the last inclusion follows trivially. Thus, for all k ≥ 0,
x(k) ∈ [x0, x0].
Suppose the statement is true for N − 1. Let KN−1 be given by the inductive hypothesis. Let
KN = KN−1 + γ, where γ is from the definition of adaptive dynamic. Suppose N is even. Fix
kˆ ≥ KN = KN−1 + γ. Then
x(kˆ) ∈ U [inf P (kˆ − γ, kˆ), supP (kˆ − γ, kˆ)]
⊂ U [inf P (KN−1, kˆ), supP (KN−1, kˆ)]
⊂ U [xN−1, xN−1] = [xN , xN ],
where membership follows from definition of an adaptive dynamic, the first inclusion follows from
P (kˆ − γ, kˆ) ⊂ P (KN−1, kˆ) and monotonicity of U , the second inclusion follows from the inductive
hypothesis and monotonicity of U , and the equality follows from lemma 1. Thus, for all k ≥ KN ,
x(k) ∈ [xN , xN ].
To prove statement (2), notice first that y0  y2 implies that the subsequence (y2k) is non-
decreasing, and by completeness, there is y such that y2k → y. Similarly, using y0  y2 ⇒ y3 =
g(y2)  g(y0) = y1, the subsequence (y2k−1) is nonincreasing, and there is y such that limk y2k = y.
Notice next that y, y ∈ FP (g◦g). This follows from the observation that y ∈ g(y), and y ∈ g(y),
as follows. Suppose y 6∈ g(y). Then there is i, and xi such that f i(xi, y−i) − f i(yi, y−i) > 0. But
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then, by upper semi-continuity in the i variable, and continuity in the −i variables, for all k
sufficiently large, f i(xi, y
2k−1
−i ) − f i(y2ki , y2k−1−i ) > 0, contradicting the optimality of y2ki . Similarly,
y ∈ g(y). Consequently, y, y are simply rationalizable.
Consider an arbitrary x0 ∈ [y, z], and an arbitrary adaptive dynamic (x(k)) starting at x0.
Consider an arbitrary convergent subsequence (x(kl)) of (x(k)). By the lemma 4, for N = 0, there
is K0 such that for all kl ≥ K0, y0  x(kl), whence y0 = x0  liml x(kl). For N = 2, there
is K2 such that for all kl ≥ K2, y2 = x2  x(kl), whence y2  liml x(kl). And by induction,
for 2N , there is K2N such that for all kl ≥ K2N , y2N = x2N  x(kl), whence y2N  liml x(kl).
Consequently, y  liml x(kl). As (x(kl)) is an arbitrary convergent subsequence, it follows that
y  lim inf x(k). Moreover, as x is the smallest fixed point of g ◦ g, it follows that x  y. Similarly,
lim supx(k)  y  x. Statement (3) follows similarly.
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